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Abstract 
The paper reviews the evidence on the challenges of digitalization for direct (corporate profit) 
and indirect (consumption) taxation. Based on both anecdotal and empirical evidence, we 
evaluate ongoing developments at the OECD and European Union level and argue that there is 
no justification for introducing a new tax order for digital businesses. In particular, the 
significant digital presence and the digital services tax as put forward by the European 
Commission will most likely distort corporate decisions and spur tax competition. To contribute 
to the development of tax rules in line with value creation as the gold standard for profit taxation 
the paper discusses data as a “new” value-driving asset in the digital economy. It draws on 
insights from interdisciplinary research to highlight that the value of data emerges through 
proprietary activities conducted within businesses. We ultimately discuss how existing transfer 
pricing solutions can be adapted to business models employing data mining. 
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1. Introduction 
Digitalization has become the leading phenomenon in today’s world since the industrial 
revolution. Scholars, politicians, and businesses uniformly agree that the digitalization of both 
the society and the economy poses several challenges to the international business tax 
framework. Most economists and supranational organizations add optimistic predictions of 
future economic growth, innovation, and societal change to the first statement on digitalization 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2017; Brynjolfsson and Mitchell 2017; OECD 2016, 2017b). With 
regard to taxation, however, considerable controversy in the tax community prevails. The 
inherent discussion is recently gaining momentum and importance since the publications of the 
OECD’s interim report on the tax challenges arising from digitalization (OECD 2018b) and the 
European Commission’s proposals on new tax rules targeting digital firms (European 
Commission 2018c, 2018b). In this paper, we review the academic evidence on the tax 
challenges of digitalization and critically assess current reform proposals against the 
background of this (lacking) evidence and the economic consequences of digitalization. We 
further discuss how to reach the often-cited goal of aligning taxation with value creation in a 
pragmatic and timely manner. 
An abundant literature on international taxation in the digital economy has emerged since the 
OECD’s Action Plan on BEPS (OECD 2013), and even more publications build on and criticize 
these articles and the OECD’s work published in the OECD’s 2015 Final Report “Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy” (OECD 2015a). It is neither the aim nor within the 
scope of this article to provide a comprehensive overview.1 However, we note that there is no 
in-depth analysis of what the current tax challenges are and that no scientific evidence exists 
for the asserted flaws in the existing tax system (Schoen 2018).2 We therefore take one step 
back and ask what exactly the tax challenges in the digital economy are. Based on empirical 
evidence, we show that both policymakers and research neglect well-known and considerable 
enforcement issues in indirect taxation (i.e., VAT in Europe) and that profit shifting might be, 
but is not necessarily, a particular concern of digital businesses. We further highlight that firms 
may optimize their tax position by making real business decisions (i.e., relocating investment) 
                                                 
1 See Olbert and Spengel (2017) for a review of articles published until early 2017. 
2 Different scholarly proposals take on a paramount view in that the current tax system, in general, is unable to 
solve the challenges of the digital economy and that a fundamental tax reform is needed, e.g., Hongler and 
Pistone (2015), Brauner and Baez Moreno (2015), Devereux and Vella (2017), Schreiber and Fell (2017), 
Schoen (2018).  Fundamental reform options might solve existing problems in theory but also raise – again in 
theory – new questions concerning taxing the digital economy (Devereux and Vella 2018). Given that such far-
reaching options for reform are unlikely to be adapted in the mid-term and that their justification is not self-
evident (Schoen 2018), this paper does not discuss these approaches in detail. It rather focuses on the recent 
developments at the level of the OECD and the European Commission. 
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– a behavior aimed at maximizing firm value (Endres and Spengel 2015; Scholes et al. 2015) 
and incentivized by international tax competition (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano 2008; 
Devereux and Vella 2018). While this phenomenon should not be labelled as aggressive tax 
planning, it might be of particular relevance in the digital economy in which countries’ tax 
codes differ substantially in their attractiveness for investments in digital business models 
(Spengel et al. 2017)3. 
In light of these insights, we welcome the OECD’s endeavor to avoid any tax-related ring-
fencing of digital firms and, instead, develop guidelines within the existing tax framework based 
on global coordination. By contrast, the European Commission’s proposed interim solution in 
the form of a Digital Services Tax (DST) is clearly ring-fencing, bears a substantial risk of 
double taxation and legal uncertainty, and most likely, does not justify its administrative costs. 
Similarly, the proposed comprehensive long-term solution – a Significant Digital Presence 
(SDP) – will ring-fence important business models given the arbitrary thresholds for its 
application. Taken together, both EC proposals would likely result in limited additional tax 
revenue collected from a few firms at the cost of increasing tax competition and economic 
distortions instead of leveraging the potential benefits of additional investments in digital 
business models within the European Union. 
We finally discuss a potential conceptual consensus on taxing digital businesses with a 
particular focus on data as a value driver. We thereby aim to shed some light on a heated but 
largely unfounded debate on whether and how firms’ use of data should be taxed. We intend to 
provide an intuitive and scientifically founded approach to conceptualize value creation within 
the existing tax framework. Based on our earlier discussion (Olbert and Spengel 2017), we 
argue that traditional businesses (currently considered non-digital) are increasingly adopting 
digital business models, too, rendering any proposals including ring-fencing elements pointless. 
We use the example of data mining as a versatile business model to show that prevailing transfer 
pricing solutions exist and that the mere collection of raw data should not trigger any profit 
taxation unless policymakers are willing to fundamentally review the justification of taxing 
rights. We do not claim to provide a final answer to the (direct) tax challenges of the digital 
economy. We rather highlight the need for further (empirical) research and offer some food for 
thought within the ongoing policy discussion. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the evidence on the tax challenges of 
digitalization covering direct and indirect taxes, and it distinguishes between anecdotal and 
                                                 
3 For the interpretation of the analytical results, see also https://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-
releases/2018/understanding-the-zew-pwc-report.html. 
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empirical evidence. Section 3 evaluates ongoing developments at the OECD and European 
Union level. Section 4 provides a discussion of value creation as the gold standard for profit 
taxation with data as a “new” value-driving asset in the digital economy. We highlight the value 
of data, draw on insights from interdisciplinary research, and show how existing transfer pricing 
solutions can be adapted to business models employing data mining. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. What do we know about the tax challenges of digitalization? 
2.1. Direct vs. indirect taxation 
In its final report on “Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy” in 2015, the 
OECD acknowledges that challenges arise in both direct and indirect taxation (OECD 2015). 
There seem to be two major challenges in collecting direct taxes, in particular corporate income 
taxes. First, digital firms are able to access foreign markets without incurring a taxable nexus 
according to prevailing, traditional standards (e.g., by a local subsidiary or sufficient physical 
presence to establish a permanent establishment (PE)). Second, digital firms presumably engage 
in more aggressive profit shifting activities since they rely on mobile and intangible assets to a 
greater extent than traditional firms. As a result, the report identifies BEPS to be exacerbated. 
The major indirect tax challenge is that highly digitalized businesses are able to locate their 
point of sales in low-tax consumption jurisdictions to minimize their VAT4 (or GST) whenever 
consumption taxes are levied based on the origin principle, i.e., the tax liability arises in the 
country where the provider of digital services or goods is located.  
The current public debate largely concentrates on the issue of profit shifting and a fair share of 
(direct) income taxation in the market location although empirical estimates point towards a 
relatively low income-tax sensitivity of profits reported by multinational firms in developed 
countries (Dharmapala 2014). As the OECD notes in its report on BEPS Action 11 (Measuring 
and Monitoring BEPS (OECD 2015b)) and recent evidence by Torslv et al. (2018) suggests, 
these empirical results might understate the true economic magnitude of tax-motivated profit 
shifting which is inherently hard to measure. With respect to indirect taxation, in contrast, it is 
evident that billions of revenue are at stake when (not) collecting consumption taxes (e.g., the 
estimated VAT gap amounts to over EUR 150 billion in the EU in 2015 (CASE and IHS 2017; 
European Commission 2016b). Therefore, the question remains why the European Commission 
does not address consumption taxes in its current policy proposals. In its 2018 interim report, 
                                                 
4 VAT refers to value-added taxes as levied in the European Union. Similarly, other countries face challenges to 
enforce other types of consumption taxes such as general sales taxes (GST) in the US. General sales taxes only 
apply to final sales made by vendors to (private) customers and are typically levied where customers are located 
if vendors have a taxable nexus at this location. 
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the OECD claims that many member states have successfully addressed these challenges by 
implementing the destination principle for B2B services (chapters 3.2 and 3.4 of the revised 
OECD International VAT/GST Guidelines (OECD 2017a)) and for B2C services (accompanied 
by a simplified registration system) as evidenced by increasing VAT revenues (OECD 2018b).5 
Rising consumption tax revenues, however, might also be a consequence of the general 
economic conditions or improved enforcement in non-digital sectors (CASE and IHS 2017) and 
we lack evidence whether (digital) consumption taxes affect corporate decisions of (digital) 
firms (Jacob, Michaely, and Müller 2018; Olbert and Werner 2018).  
In a recent working paper, Olbert and Werner (2018) find that digital firms in the service sector 
significantly decrease (increase) reported sales in the country of their incorporation in response 
to VAT rate increases (cuts) between 2007 and 2015. Assuming the location of a multinational 
group’s subsidiaries (firms) is fixed and independent of VAT changes, this evidence is 
consistent with firms channeling sales of digital services and goods through locations with 
lower VAT rates. In its strategy on the Digital Single Market the European Commission has 
acknowledged that a consumption tax system with low compliance costs and no discrimination 
based on the location of vendors or consumers is indispensable to avoid economic distortions 
in the digital economy (European Commission 2016a). Indeed, Hoopes, Thornock, and 
Williams (2016) show that circumventing sales taxes in the US provides a competitive 
advantage of e-commerce sellers and the evidence in Olbert and Werner (2018) highlights that 
digital firms are particularly sensitive to VAT rates (holding other macroeconomic factors 
constant). Consumption taxes or more general forms of destination-based taxes are typically 
justified by the existence of a market’s demand side (Devereux and Vella 2017; Schoen 2018). 
Consequently, the enforcement of the destination principle is not only key to restoring 
uncollected consumption tax revenue, but should also be considered in the discussion of 
reforming corporate income taxation. If the destination principle is successfully implemented 
for digital transactions, jurisdictions in which digital providers have no nexus for income 
taxation are compensated for providing a consumer market. We therefore encourage researchers 
and policymakers to focus on the role of consumption taxes (i.e., VAT in the EU) in the digital 
economy from two perspectives: as a tax that affects corporate decisions and as a tax that 
contributes to collecting a fair share of revenue in market countries. 
  
                                                 
5 E.g., EUR 3 billion collected through the EU’s MOSS regime in the first year of adoption (2015) or ZAR 585 
million in South Africa after applying a similar principle recommended by the OECD in 2016/2017. 
5 
 
2.2. Real decisions vs. tax avoidance 
The OECD states that current international tax standards may not have kept pace with changes 
in global business practices, in particular in the area of intangibles and the development of the 
digital economy (OECD 2013, 2015, 2018). While the current policy debate definitely points at 
several fundamental weaknesses of the current system for taxing businesses in the digital 
economy (e.g., Devereux and Vella 2017), the overall concern lies with (corporate) taxpayers’ 
behavior as to minimize their taxes. Minimizing (corporate) taxes, often labelled tax avoidance 
in the literature, is the result of any transaction that has an effect on a firm’s explicit tax liability 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Abstracting from any illegal behavior (e.g., non-compliant 
sheltering), such tax planning activities range from real activities that are tax favored (i.e., 
investing in a low-tax country or low-taxed asset) to more artificial activities specifically 
targeted to minimize taxes (e.g., treaty shopping through holding companies). 
We argue that it is important to distinguish between real activities and “pure formal”, legally 
structured tax planning activities when evaluating current policy, corporate behavior, and 
reform proposals. A recent study examines the costs of capital for effective marginal and 
average tax rates (EATRs) for profitable hypothetical investments in digital business models 
(Spengel et al. 2017). The study builds on a neoclassical model adapted from Devereux and 
Griffith (1998) and compares the effective tax burdens of marginal and profitable investments 
in assets of traditional business models (machinery, industrial buildings, inventory, financial 
assets, acquired IP) with those of investments in digital business models (self-developed and 
acquired software, IT hardware, self-developed and acquired IP). Ireland as a commonly 
labelled tax haven for multinational firms and also Italy6 stand out as very attractive locations 
for real investments in digital business models, while Germany, France, Japan, and the US 
(before the 2017 enactment of tax reform) rank last. The primary drivers of these results are the 
following. (i) Investment costs of digital business models can typically be immediately 
expensed (e.g., personnel expense in the course of data mining or software development); (ii) 
fixed asset investments of digital businesses such as acquired software typically face more 
generous depreciation rates than traditional assets such as plant or machinery; and (iii) special 
provisions such as bonus/hyper deductions for high-tech investments (e.g., in Italy), R&D tax 
credits (e.g., in Austria), and IP box regimes favor digital business models to a substantially 
greater extent than traditional businesses. 
                                                 
6 The study only considers factors of direct taxation (i.e., tax rates and rules determining the corporate income 
tax base). New tax rules targeting turnover of firms in the digital economy such as the 3% “web tax” on digital 
transactions such as in Italy might have adverse effects on a country’s attractiveness for digital companies. 
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Companies investing in digital technologies and business models considering these tax factors 
when deciding about locating their investments will optimize their direct tax burden which is a 
cost to the business (Scholes et al. 2015). Companies making such real decisions should thus 
not be blamed for being overly tax aggressive if their reported tax liabilities experience a 
downward trend. In contrast, it is obvious that policymakers intend companies to make such 
decisions since FDI in general and investments in digital technologies are expected to spur 
economic growth and increase employment rates. For instance, the Irish government and the 
Italian government offer tax incentives of around EUR 13 billion to stimulate investment in 
digital industrial platform actions (Irish Department of Finance 2018; Lazaro 2017). 
If companies engage in particularly aggressive BEPS, such behavior should be combatted with 
anti-avoidance measures because, in contrast to real decisions in response to tax incentive 
stemming from countries’ tax competition, such BEPS undermines the concept of taxing 
economic rents. Respective legislation has been developed over the past decades and is being 
implemented in domestic tax law following the BEPS action plan and the European 
Commission’s ATAD directive (Council of the European Union 2016). Yet, such aggressive 
tax planning is not particular to the digital economy7 and the respective measures should apply 
equally to all sectors of the economy. If policymakers, however, are concerned that little or no 
taxable profits of digital business models are allocated to countries in which they access 
consumer markets but have not invested in such a manner that a taxable presence under current 
legislation exists, one should carefully evaluate the current framework (see section 4) 
(Devereux and Vella 2018).  
2.3. Anecdotal vs. empirical evidence of BEPS 
As noted in the media and some scholarly articles (Dharmapala 2014; Economist 2016), there 
are prominent examples of multinational companies with digital business models paying little 
taxes in countries with large markets and reporting relatively low global ETRs. This anecdotal 
evidence has been a driving force of the debate and policy work on BEPS. An often-neglected 
fact is that similar anecdotal evidence exists for purely non-digital companies that sell, for 
instance, hardware, construction equipment, or food. One might argue that some of these firms 
rely on intangible assets such as their brand and that internet (platform) technologies contribute 
to brand value. Yet, enough anecdotes on firms obviously considered as part of the traditional 
economy exist. Thus, such anecdotes cannot serve as a justification for new tax rules for the 
digital economy itself. However, they suggest that the application of profit allocation rules and 
                                                 
7 The consensus in the literature seems to be in line with the OECD’s statement that the problem is rather 
exacerbated in the digital economy. 
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respective anti-avoidance legislation is unsatisfactory if such tax structures are considered a 
BEPS issue. 
Empirical evidence on the tax challenges in the digital economy, to the best of our knowledge, 
is very scarce. It is well documented that companies strategically locate intangible assets such 
as valuable patents (Dischinger and Riedel 2011; Ernst, Richter, and Riedel 2014; Griffith, 
Miller, and O’Connell 2014) and trademarks (Heckemeyer, Olligs, and Overesch 2018) in low-
tax jurisdictions. The common understanding is that digital businesses heavily rely on 
intangibles throughout their value chain (OECD 2015). Yet, these intangibles often differ from 
those reported in financial statements or measured in patent and trademark statistics and can 
take the form of organizational capital, self-developed software and platforms, and processed 
data, among others (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; El Sawy and Pereiry 2013).  Klassen et al. 
(2014) provide a theoretical model and some consistent empirical evidence that e-commerce 
decreases the cost of income shifting and enables US MNCs to lower their reported GAAP 
effective tax rates. Apart from that, we know nothing about particularly aggressive income 
shifting in the digital economy, i.e., whether firms strategically use the above-mentioned 
intangible assets to facilitate income tax planning.8 
 
3. A brief review of recent policy developments 
3.1. OECD BEPS Action 1 
On 16 March 2018, the OECD published the details “Tax Challenges Arising from 
Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018” (OECD 2018b) as part of its work on Action 1 of its 
Action Plan on BEPS. While labelled “interim,” this report builds on the 2015 “final” report on 
addressing the tax challenges (OECD 2015)9 and provides a much more detailed analysis of the 
characteristics of the digital economy and digital business models and a more critical discussion 
of potential solutions to address the tax challenges.10  
In the interim report, the OECD devotes one entire chapter (2) to the main features of certain 
highly digitalized business models and the notion of value creation. In particular, the OECD 
offers a first attempt to substantiate the term “value creation” by distinguishing between three 
types of digital value creation and by providing several case studies: Through (1) value chains, 
high-technology companies create value by converting inputs into outputs via discrete and 
sequential but interrelated activities. Yet, more digitalized companies are supposed to operate 
                                                 
8 Olbert and Werner (2018) find only limited evidence of a stronger tax sensitivity of pre-tax earnings for digital 
firms in the European service sector. 
9 For a detailed review of the 2015 final report, see Olbert and Spengel (2017). 
10 For a condensed summary, see EY (2018). 
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through multi-sided (2) value networks in which mediating technologies (e.g., a software 
interface) are used by platform firms to link users (i.e., customers) to engage in transactions. In 
one-sided markets, companies employ (3) value shops to serve one specific type of user or 
customer with a technology-intensive application. Based on this business model analysis, the 
OECD stresses that the main characteristics of digital business models are scale without mass 
(low marginal costs of serving a large number of customers), reliance on intangible assets, and 
the collection of data from user participation.  
With regard to potential (new) approaches to taxing digital business models, the OECD 
considers the implementation and the impact of the BEPS package and reviews domestic 
interim measures. The review covers (1) alternative PE thresholds as adapted in Israel and India, 
(2) additional withholding taxes, (3) turnover taxes as Italy’s levy on digital transactions, and 
(4) specific regimes targeted at large firms, namely the Diverted Profits Tax in the UK or the 
recent BEAT provisions of the 2017 US tax reform. However, the OECD did not recommend 
any of these or any other targeted measures as interim solutions. Instead, the OECD concludes 
that there is no possibility to ring-fence the digital economy and that member countries currently 
do not reach any consensus such that further consideration is needed. The OECD seems to favor 
the revision and adaption of the current framework with a particular focus on nexus and profit 
allocation. Importantly, the OECD stresses that if, however, national governments decide to 
pursue interim measures, such rules should comply with international standards and trade 
obligations, be temporary and targeted, and minimize the impact on start-up companies and 
administrative burdens. An update on the OECD’s work should be expected in 2019 with the 
aim of reaching a consensus-based solution by 2020. 
 
3.2. Proposed Council Directives by the European Commission 
After the report of the EU High Level Expert Group in 2014 that supported the development of 
ideas to tax digital businesses on a destination basis (European Commission 2014; Olbert and 
Spengel 2017), the European Commission went further than the OECD and issued two draft 
Council Directives on 21 March 2018: (1) Taxation of profits based on a corporation’s 
Significant Digital Presence (SDP) and (2) a common system for a Digital Services Tax 
(DST).11 While the latter (2) option should serve as an interim solution until definite rules on 
the first (1) option can be established as a comprehensive solution, both proposals ultimately 
aim at the attribution of taxing rights to the jurisdiction where users are located. The European 
                                                 
11 For a more detailed overview and a preliminary discussion, see Petruzzi and Koukoulioti (2018) and Sheppard 
(2018).  
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Commission asks EU member states to adopt the proposals into domestic law by 31 December 
2019. 
The SDP (1) defines criteria of a “digital footprint” of a business in a jurisdiction which is 
deemed to exist if (i) annual revenue from the provision of digital services to users amounts to 
at least EUR 7 million, (ii) at least 100,000 users are served, or (iii) 3,000 business contracts 
with users are concluded in a fiscal year. It further covers the attribution of profits based on 
economically significant activities related to data and users. Here, the SDP would constitute a 
hypothetical separate enterprise and the traditional functional analysis would be conducted to 
attribute profits according to the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. When profits must be 
allocated among different entities (and countries), the EC essentially mandates the use of the 
profit-split method if the taxpayer does not prove that some other transfer pricing method is 
more appropriate (Sheppard 2018). Proposed splitting factors are R&D and marketing costs, 
the number of users, and data collected in each country, respectively. 
The EC acknowledges that the proposal of the SDP lacks thorough elaboration in particular 
concerning the mechanism of allocating profits. As political action is desired, the DST is 
proposed as an intermediate, targeted solution (2). It prescribes a 3% levy on gross revenue (net 
of VAT and other taxes) resulting from the supply of advertising, intermediation, and 
transmission of data services. The tax should be collected in the country where the recipient of 
the service (i.e., the payer of the revenue) is located. The tax base is the sum of revenues only 
from placing advertisements on a digital interface targeted at users of that interface, offering a 
multi-sided digital interface where commercial and non-commercial users interact, and the 
transmission of data collected about users and generated from users’ activities on digital 
interfaces. The EC provides for a specific list of services exempt from the tax such as the direct 
provision or sale of online content (e.g., video streaming, downloadable software applications). 
The tax liability only arises if the taxpayer’s (group of affiliated entities) worldwide revenue 
exceeds EUR 750 million and the within-EU revenue exceeds EUR 50 million. While the 
collection of the tax is based on the origin of the revenue stream, the distribution of the tax 
revenues to countries follows allocation keys related to users’ activities which are mainly 
influenced by the number of users in a given country. The EC anticipates that the 
implementation and enforcement of such tax are difficult tasks for EU member states and 
therefore considers a one-stop shop solution similar to the newly established MOSS for the 
collection of VAT on electronic B2C services. 
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3.3. Critical Assessment 
While the difficulty to reach consensus among member states and the conflicting interests 
between industrial countries and small and open economies might have influenced the major 
conclusions in the OECD’s 2018 interim report, the report offers valuable advancements in the 
discussion of how to deal with new forms of value creation when taxing international business 
profits. The OECD offers a detailed business model analysis which is the first of its kind on the 
international policy level. Along the lines of Olbert and Spengel (2017), the OECD 
acknowledges that digital business models can and should be analyzed carefully to enable the 
revision and final application of existing guidelines. The OECD goes further and proposes to 
differentiate between value chains, value networks, and value shops. While practitioners and 
scholars in management science and economics might disagree with these concepts or might 
want to propose further criteria, we welcome such form of classification as it can be applied to 
businesses within a wide range of industries and degrees of vertical integration. Such concepts 
should not be viewed as mutually exclusive or only applicable to “purely” digital firms, but 
rather as additional frameworks for conducting a functional analysis according to the OECD 
transfer pricing guidelines.  
The work on profit allocation is particularly relevant and should be prioritized over additional 
or revised nexus rules for two reasons. First, even if new forms of taxable nexus are established, 
the question of allocating profits resulting from a highly integrated, cross-border business is 
inevitable. Second, most digital businesses that are obviously targeted in the current policy 
discussions do have a salient taxable nexus in countries in which consumer markets are 
relatively large.12 Thus, re-thinking the way profits are allocated might already address many 
of the perceived tax challenges. However, the re-thinking exercise is more demanding and 
requires more work than what has been published so far. While the OECD acknowledges in its 
2015 report that the value of data in digital business models is directly reflected (or monetized) 
in local advertising revenue (OECD 2015), the 2018 report contains no specific indication on 
the role and value of data as an asset and any activities around the use of data for corporate tax 
purposes. The OECD also acknowledges that “none of the BEPS measures were conceived to 
clarify the possible treatment and relative value of data”. We consider more detailed work on 
                                                 
12 For instance, Facebook operates through a German subsidiary (Facebook Germany GmbH) that is registered in 
Hamburg. The company has offices in Hamburg and Berlin. Also, smaller and younger digital companies make 
physical investments in their important local markets. For example, the French company Payfit was founded in 
2016 and employs a business model in the financial technology sector. It enables small and medium enterprises 
to easily and quickly pay their employees and operates through office locations in Cyprus, the UK, Gibraltar, 
France, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom. See https://payfit.com/fr/.  
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the tax treatment of data extremely important (and urgent). The collection, transformation, and 
use of data within business models (collectively called data mining) are becoming integral 
elements of the value chains of both purely digital and also previously physical (traditional) 
companies (see section 4.).  
Both the media and scholars have perceived the EC’s proposals on the SDP and the DST as a 
rushed and shortsighted attempt to gain momentum in the policy debate (Becker and Englisch 
2018; Bloomberg 2018). In particular, the DST has received the most direct criticism due to its 
potential to create additional (double) taxation and legal uncertainty for taxpayers, to clash with 
international trade regulation, and to be ring-fencing and distortive. Moreover, the DST would 
severely limit the flexibility of EU member states in terms of international tax competition (CFE 
Fiscal Committee 2018; Devereux and Vella 2018; van Horzen and van Esdonk 2018; Petruzzi 
and Koukoulioti 2018; Sheppard 2018; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim 
Bundesfinanzministerium (The Advisory Board to the (German) Federal Ministry of Finance) 
2018). We share this criticism and do not aim to provide a more detailed discussion of these 
critical points. The EC’s proposals obviously depart from the current system and will raise new 
issues that the EC might still address or discuss in the near future.  
Instead, we will discuss the presumptions taken by the EC against the background of the 
political goals as communicated together with the proposals for the two directives.13 The EC 
states that there is a misalignment between taxation and the place of value creation. The two 
proposals are supposed to contribute to a “modern and stable tax framework which stimulates 
innovation", to a "solution which can ensure a fair and effective taxation”, to “rules…that are 
fit for the characteristics of digital businesses”, to making “sure that public finances … are 
sustainable”, and to “fight(ing) against aggressive tax planning”. We identified six 
presumptions in the EC’s communication, the proposed measures, and its impact assessment 
that and will briefly comment on these presumptions in the following. 
1. Corporate tax rules are outdated 
Undoubtedly, the current framework of international and domestic tax law in place dates back 
to a time in which the use of information technologies by most businesses was far from intense 
or sophisticated, if even existent. Since then, entirely new business models (and companies) 
have emerged and are still emerging. One can thus conclude that tax rules are outdated and that 
the time is right to re-think the current framework and existing rules (Devereux and Vella 2017). 
                                                 
13 The respective documentation is available at https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/fair-
taxation-digital-economy_en.  
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Further, as the OECD discusses in chapter 7 of the 2018 interim report, digitalization might also 
bring opportunities for the administration and collection of corporate taxes. 
2. Digital businesses are undertaxed 
On its webpage, in its communication, and through other media channels, the EC prominently 
claims that digital businesses are undertaxed and refers to empirical results of a joint study of 
the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW), the University of Mannheim, and PwC 
(“Digital Tax Index 2017”, (Spengel et al. 2017)). We highlight that the Commission's  
statement that “companies with digital business models pay less than half the tax rate of 
businesses with traditional business models” is prone to misinterpretations.14 Such real under-
taxation, i.e., that some companies really “pay” less tax than they are supposed to, can be the 
result of aggressive tax planning (avoidance) strategies. However, the study by Spengel et al. 
(2017) measures average effective tax rates (AETRs) and the cost of capital for stylized 
marginal and profitable corporate investments in typical assets of digital business models. The 
quantification relies on a neoclassical investment model (Devereux and Griffith 1998, 1999, 
2003) and incorporates many relevant tax parameters that affect an investment in digital assets 
such as developed or acquired software in a given country. Investments in digital business 
models, on average, face lower average effective tax rates (and costs of capital) since more 
favorable depreciation rates typically apply to software and information technologies 
(compared to industrial buildings and machinery) and digital business models benefit to a 
greater extent from special incentives such as R&D credits and IP box regimes.15 Overall, the 
numbers refer to effective tax burdens of stylized investments and not to any payments made 
by real-life corporations. By contrast, there is no empirical evidence that digital firms pay 
systematically less taxes than traditional firms (Bauer 2018). Thus, corresponding public 
statements should be made with the right amount of care. 
3. A pre-specified amount of revenue, number of customers, and number of concluded 
contracts are valid criteria to determine a significant digital presence  
Specifying quantitative thresholds for the applicability of rules is always, at least to some extent, 
arbitrary. For instance, there is no theoretical argument why firms with exactly EUR 750 million 
should provide Country-by-Country Reporting and firms with EUR 749 million should not or 
why the threshold for deductible interest according to the ATAD is exactly 30% of EBITDA 
and not 20% or 40%. However, such thresholds are imperfect remedies with an underlying 
                                                 
14 See also https://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-releases/2018/understanding-the-zew-pwc-report.html.  
15 The European Commission acknowledges this result in its impact assessment of the proposed directives, 
accordingly (European Commission 2018a). 
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justification given the legal purpose of the rule. With regards to the SDP, justifying quantitative 
criteria at all is problematic. Digital business models are unique as evidenced by the challenge 
to identify and quantify so-called hard-to-value intangibles and the emergence of monopoly 
power and network effects (OECD 2015). As a result, different digital business models have 
different forms of generating revenue, interacting with users, and concluding contracts. In 
particular, the proposed criteria assume the importance of users and concluded contracts to be 
homogenous. For example, a highly specialized B2B digital services provider16 might provide 
a platform with only a few hundred users and might conclude only a few but economically large 
contracts with its customers. To generate the same amount of revenue, a digital services 
provider that offers a platform with both B2C and B2B applications such as a professional social 
media platform, interacts with millions of customers and concludes a massive number of small-
scale contracts. 
4. The DST applies where largest gap between value creation and the ability to tax exists 
The EC labels the digital services tax as the interim solution that “focuses on activities where 
there is a large gap between the value created and member states’ ability to tax it – where user 
participation and user contribution play a central role in value creation.” Within the proposal, 
the EC provides a relatively clear-cut definition of what types of services the tax is levied (see 
section 3.2). However, there is no further description of the gap between value creation and the 
ability to tax profits and, in particular, no explanation why this gap is particularly large with 
respect to companies that offer services falling under the scope of the DST as opposed to 
services that are excluded from the scope of the DST, such as content streaming services. Thus, 
prominent firms offering these services such as Netflix, Soundcloud, and Amazon (with its 
respective services for video and music streaming) will not face such tax (Sheppard 2018). This 
suggests that there is no or no large gap between value creation and the ability to tax profits of 
these business models. These business models, however, produce streaming content based on a 
detailed analysis of large amounts of collected user data. For example, Netflix states “in the 
ordinary course of business and in particular in connection with content acquisition and 
merchandising our service to our members, we collect and utilize data supplied by our 
members” and “(…) laws that limit our ability to collect, transfer and use data, could have an 
adverse effect on our business.”17 Further, these companies collect user data, offer their 
                                                 
16 For instance, kloeckner.i offers tools and platforms with front to end digital solutions for the steel industry, 
https://www.kloeckner-i.com/en/.  
17 According to Netflix’s annual report for fiscal year 2018 (10k). Further, in the privacy statement, the company 
states that “For example, we use information to: (…) analyze and understand our audience, improve our service 
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streaming services, and have the potential to collect advertising revenue all around the globe 
without establishing a physical nexus. Against this background, it is at least questionable why 
the EC seems not to conclude that “user participation and user contribution play a central role 
in value creation” in these cases. This simple example shows that applying the DST only to 
arbitrarily selected firms engaged in online advertising and firms that have very salient multi-
sided interfaces might not only ring-fence the digital from the traditional economy but might 
even cause further ring-fencing within the digital economy. 
5. It is possible to distinguish between business models for which DST applies 
Another implicit assumption within the proposal for a DST is that it is actually possible to 
distinguish between revenues for which the DST is supposed to apply and those that should not 
fall under the scope of the DST. In practice, however, the collection of the DST would often 
imply the differentiation between services offered by the same company. If all companies with 
total worldwide revenue exceeding EUR 750 million and revenue within the EU exceeding 
EUR 50 million are potentially liable to the DST, the business models of a wide range of 
companies both in the purely digital and also in the traditional sectors would have to be assessed 
in great detail. For example, Alphabet Inc.’s (i.e., Google’s) video and music platform YouTube 
allows users to stream online content for free or based on a subscription fee. Such services 
would be excluded from the DST (see above). However, the platform also connects private 
users with commercial users (e.g., music labels, broadcasters) and allows Alphabet to collect 
advertising revenue. Such services would clearly fall under the scope of the DST. An exemplary 
case in the (formerly) traditional automotive sector is the German car manufacturer BMW. Up 
to date, BMW generates its largest share of revenue by selling cars (i.e., a non-digital business 
model). However, BMW is currently promoting its Connected Drive applications that will be 
an increasingly important source of revenue. Customers pay for a subscription to BMW’s online 
platform and can then consume digital services on-demand. Such services cover content 
streaming but also other platform services that fall within the scope of the DST. Further, BMW 
connects private users with commercial users that can sell their services to BMW’s customers. 
Alphabet, BMW, and any other competitor with similar business models and of similar size fall 
within the size threshold of the DST and will need to carefully evaluate to what extent the DST 
could be levied on their services revenue. Even abstracting from the fact that the portfolio of 
services and the revenue mix of those companies will be rapidly changing in the future, the 
administrative burden and legal uncertainty will be immense for both taxpayers and authorities. 
                                                 
(including our user interface experiences) and optimize content selection, recommendation algorithms and 
delivery,” see https://help.netflix.com/legal/privacy?locale=en&country=DE.  
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6. It is “necessary to find a targeted, interim solution at the EU level” 
The discussion of presumptions 1-5 stresses the notion that changing the tax regime by imposing 
new forms of taxes is not necessarily justified but might instead lead to new issues (Devereux 
and Vella 2018; Schoen 2018). Our practical examples and recent scholarly contributions 
highlight that both the DST and the SDP are clearly ring-fencing and potentially lead to 
economic distortions since companies might face double taxation, legal uncertainty, and 
increasing effective tax burdens. If the EC seriously strives to support European companies to 
flourish in the digital economy,18 these approaches might counteract this overarching goal 
(Schoen 2018).  
Further, it is doubtful whether the targeted interim solution (DST) actually contributes to 
sustainable public finances. The estimated additional revenue of EUR 5 billion constitutes an 
unweighted average of EUR 179 m per EU member state. Policymakers should carefully 
evaluate whether this figure has the potential to generate fairness and efficiency in the EU tax 
systems, protect the integrity and a proper functioning of the single market,19 and outweigh the 
potential compliance costs as discussed in this article. In this vein, it is not surprising that several 
EU member states such as Scandinavian countries, Ireland, the UK and, most likely, Germany20 
are recently taking a more careful, if not reluctant, position. Given this development, the EC 
might focus on developing a comprehensive solution along the lines of the OECD instead since 
this approach has proven successful in other areas of the BEPS project. 
 
4. Value creation in data-driven businesses 
4.1. Conceptual consensus and ways forward 
Research and macroeconomic statistics confirm that data is an increasingly important value 
driver. However, the views on what exactly the value of data is and how it should be treated for 
corporate income tax purposes are diverging and often premature.21 In this section, we aim to 
highlight that the ways data contribute to value creation can differ widely across industries and 
businesses. We offer a conceptual approach to think about the data-driven value creation 
process within the tax policy debate. Such a conceptual approach could then help to assess 
                                                 
18 EC, A fair end efficient tax system in the EU for the digital single market, 2017 
19 explanatory memorandum 
20 See https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/eu-finance-ministers-give-cool-reception-to-digital-tax-
plan-1.3478055 and https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article181433612/Internetkonzerne-Scholz-will-fiskalisches-
Eigentor-bei-Digitalsteuer-verhindern.html.  
21 For a detailed discussion, see (Olbert and Spengel 2017).  
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specific digital business models since they all rely on some form of value creation through the 
collection and use of data. 
While businesses have always relied on some form of data, the ongoing discussion refers to 
businesses using large amounts of data that help to make better business decisions and shape 
entire business models. Such data is often labeled Big Data. To extract value from Big Data, 
businesses have to go through an “entire discovery process that requires insightful analysts, 
business users, and executives who ask the right questions, recognize patterns, make informed 
assumptions, and predict behavior” (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2017; Oracle 2018). Figure 1 
shows that the market for big data, i.e., investments, applications, and services related to this 
discovery process, is expected to grow steadily in the future and offers businesses great 
potential. In 2018, the global big data industry was expected to be worth more than USD 50 
billion. Since the value of data, in general, can hardly be reflected in current accounting figures 
produced by businesses (Lev and Gu 2017),22 we suggest to think about the specific investments 
and activities businesses conducted to create value with data. As recent research in innovation 
management confirms, it is not the quantity of (user) data but the quality of how such data is 
used to generate network effects that is crucial for value creation (Schrage 2016). While it might 
seem too superficial from a technical point of view, we refer to the phenomenon of data mining 
when analyzing these investments and activities in the next section. 
 
 Figure 1: Big Data Market Forecast Worldwide from 2011-2026, by segment (in USD billion), 
source: Statista23  
                                                 
22 https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2018/04/18/assessing-value-in-the-digital-economy/  
23 Available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/255970/global-big-data-market-forecast-by-segment/.  
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On the international tax policy level, it is widely acknowledged that the value of data should be 
considered when taxing business profits.24 Put simply, there are two general options to adapt 
the tax system to reflect the value of data. First, one could acknowledge that it is impossible to 
correctly reflect the value of data (and other processes in digital business models) in the existing 
framework. Such acknowledgement would call for a fundamental tax reform with options 
ranging from a destination based cash flow to a residence based shareholder taxation as 
proposed by leading scholars (Devereux and Vella 2017; Schoen 2018). The merit of such 
reforms is that the tax base would depend on rather immobile factors limiting the potential of 
economic distortions, tax planning, and tax competition (Devereux and Vella 2018). 
Considering the need for international consensus and inherent political feasibility, a more 
promising approach in the near future would be the second option to further develop existing 
principles, i.e., allocating profits according to the arm’s length principle based on the separate 
entity approach. A major task would first be to define the notion of value creation and then 
produce some clear guidance on how to allocate profits.25 
In an earlier publication, we have suggested that a thorough analysis of digital business models 
based on interdisciplinary research and practical examples is both feasible and presents a 
promising starting point to adapt the existing tax framework concerning the allocation of profits 
(Olbert and Spengel 2017). Schoen (2018) further argues that such an approach helps to rethink 
the notion of taxable nexus in terms of where companies commit to digital investments. In 
general, digital business model analysis shows that digitalization produces intangibles that are 
not only quantifiable fixed assets but also involve process changes and “organizational 
inventions” (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). Businesses create value along their entire value 
chain and information technologies are no longer supportive elements but integral parts of the 
value chain (Porter 1985, Amir and Zott 2011, OECD 2018b). In their recent work, Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee (2017) highlight that businesses can harness the forces of three new types of assets: 
machines (intelligent computers), platforms (business models using software interfaces), and 
crowds (high-scale access to information and users). They argue, however, that the respective 
counterparts of the old economy: mind (people), products (physical goods and services), and 
core (internal knowledge across the supply chain) are not obsolete. Instead, there is a common 
“need to rethink the balance” between these new and old assets in order to understand “when, 
where, how, and why machines, platform, and crowds can be effective (…)”. The World Bank 
estimates that 64% of the global wealth resided in human capital in 2014 (World Bank Group 
                                                 
24 EU (2014), OECD (2015), OECD (2018), HM Treasury (2018). 
25 We acknowledge that the paradigm to tax business profits in line with value creation is not uncontested and no 
perfect solutions exist in theory (see, e.g., Devereux and Vella (2018) and Schoen (2018)). 
18 
 
2018). In today’s increasingly digital economy, any efforts to design tax rules in line with value 
creation should thus center on the role (and location) of specific people functions in integrated, 
digital business models. 
4.2. An application: data mining 
During the rise of the digital economy, claims have been made that data contains value similar 
to valuable natural resources like oil. However, this analogy is flawed (Marr 2018, Goldfein 
and Nguyen 2018). Data only compounds in value if it is tied to a particular problem domain 
and solves problems for customers and businesses. In other words, data needs to be transformed 
by businesses that aim at value creation and this fact should be taken into account when thinking 
about corporate income taxation and data. Clearly, (raw) data is not comparable to oil. 
The concept of data mining refers to the techniques, methods, and algorithms to analyze large 
amounts of data with the ultimate goal to transform data into knowledge (Witten et al. 2017, 
Larose et al. 2014). When put into the context of a business model analysis, data mining can be 
considered as the part of a business model that creates value out of data. This notion is 
confirmed by practical and empirical evidence that companies invest in data mining with the 
ultimate purpose to increase their return on investment (Boire 2014). We aim to conceptualize 
the process of data mining that can be spread across different legal entities and functions of a 
globally operating company. While this approach does not provide a specific business model 
analysis of a single company, some form of data mining is inherent to any digital business 
model. It should thus be helpful to thinking about profit allocation for tax purposes in line with 
value creation in the digital economy. For example, many products of Alphabet Inc. directly 
rely on the data mining process, which does not necessarily involve the use of personal user 
data but involves every form of data that is generated by the use of Google’s products and 
services.26 Other data applications of companies offering physical goods or services are more 
subtle since the internal data mining process helps to develop these goods and services 
internally.27 
                                                 
26 “A big challenge is in developing metrics, designing experimental methodologies, and modeling the space to 
create parsimonious representations that capture the fundamentals of the problem. These problems cut across 
Google’s products and services, from designing experiments for testing new auction algorithms to developing 
automated metrics to measure the quality of a road map. Data mining lies at the heart of many of these questions, 
and the research done at Google is at the forefront of the field”. See 
https://ai.google/research/pubs?area=DataMiningandModeling.  
27 For example, SAP’s Netweaver Business Warehouse (based on the S4/Hana platform) helps industrial 
companies to manage and leverage their internal data to improve a diverse range of (non-digital) business 
models. See 
https://help.sap.com/saphelp_erp60_sp/helpdata/de/4a/eb293b31de281de10000000a114084/content.htm.  
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Figure 2 depicts the process of data mining with raw data located at the left end of the picture 
and valuable “knowledge” symbolized by a diamond at the right end. In a B2C business model, 
a company collects raw data from users located in their consumer market and finally uses the 
knowledge when deciding about what services to offer where and when and how to develop 
them. In a traditional, industrial business model, a company might collect raw data on its 
internal transactions (e.g., wear and tear, results of chemical reactions ) at a plant in a country 
where few other business functions are located and finally uses knowledge to improve and sell 
services in several foreign markets. The current political concern is that companies can collect 
raw data and later sell their services and products (leveraged by knowledge) without 
establishing a (physical) taxable nexus under existing rules in markets where data is collected. 
Profit taxation typically occurs where companies (report to) allocate knowledge as proxied by 
entrepreneurial functions (people, assets, risk). 
 
 Figure 2: The process of Data Mining, source: own depiction28 
As the figure shows, value creation through data mining, however, requires several activities to 
transform raw data into valuable knowledge. First, a business has to decide upon data selection 
to extract target data from raw data. For instance, only some of the information gathered from 
consumers or transactions is relevant for creating future value. Then, this data must be processed 
and transformed into a format that is useful for the subsequent analysis. The next step involves 
data mining when defined more narrowly, i.e., a company’s data scientists that collaborate with 
managers at diverse business functions (Boire 2014, McKinsey Global Institute 2016, Witten 
                                                 
28 Based on https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324171539/download. Icons taken from authors Freepik 
and Smashicons by flaticon.com. 
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et al. 2017) analyze the data to recognize patterns and models in the data. When these patterns 
are interpreted, the value is finally created for the business model. 
Each digital business model and each traditional business model that gradually experiences a 
digital transformation is unique and, consequently, creates value through data mining in 
different ways. Also, a company might not engage in all steps of the outlined data mining 
process but either outsource some parts of it or, for example, monetize processed or transformed 
data by selling it to third parties that then engage in further data mining activities. Accordingly, 
different legal entities of the same company can be engaged in different steps of the data mining 
process. 
The matrix in Figure 3 illustrates this argument. The upper horizontal axis summarizes the 
process of data mining as illustrated in Figure 2. Along this process, data gains in value. The 
vertical axis on the left categorizes different types of how businesses can use data to create 
value within their business models. Businesses might be involved in one or more data mining 
processes and use the data to generate revenue in different forms (“usage types”). For example, 
some data providers exclusively engage in collecting raw data and selling it to businesses that 
further transform and analyze this data. The international mass media and information firm 
Thomson Reuters, depicted on the bottom left, generates substantial revenue by collecting 
company data and macroeconomic data (mostly financial information) and then selling it to 
other parties that extract value from it (e.g., financial analysts or researchers). Other companies 
like Netflix (see above, here depicted in the middle on the top of the matrix) are internal users 
of data as they collect, select, and process data on its customers. Based on this internal data, 
Netflix improves and develops its service portfolio. Other businesses conduct more advanced 
data mining and use the valuable data (i.e., knowledge) internally or sell services or physical 
products based on the extracted value. For instance, the German engineering company Bosch 
covers the entire data mining process from collecting to interpreting the mined data and, based 
on the gained knowledge, offers a wide range of physical products. Its business customers in 
different industries use these products that are connected to Bosch’s internet of things 
platform.29 Google, as noted earlier, offers a wide range of services and products that are created 
based on different processes of data mining, i.e., based on different levels of sophistication with 
respect to the data mining process. Another example is the financial services company Visa 
with its IntelliLink application. Visa also covers the entire data mining process and transforms 
                                                 
29 See https://www.bosch-si.com/iot-platform/bosch-iot-suite/homepage-bosch-iot-suite.html.  
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its business clients’ transactional data into valuable knowledge that clients pay for and use to 
make better business decisions.30 
 
 Figure 3: Categorization and examples of data mining business models 
4.3. Leveraging data and digital business model analysis for transfer pricing 
The challenge for allocating profits to legal entities within an integrated company according to 
the arm’s length principle (and, presumably, in line with value creation) is to identify in what 
part of the data mining process a legal entity (i.e., taxpayer) is engaged. The next question is 
what is the value of the specific activities relative to the overall value created through data 
mining? This transfer pricing challenge could be addressed based on the conceptual analysis of 
the data mining process and the different business models that exist along the value chain of 
data mining. 
Transfer pricing according to the arm’s length principle relies on the comparability of controlled 
(intrafirm) transactions with third-party transactions (United Nations 2017, OECD 2017c). The 
very nature of intrafirm transactions often makes it impossible to find third market comparables 
(Keuschnigg and Devereux 2013) and this problem is obviously inherent to data-driven 
business models, too. We argue, however, that transfer pricing solutions can be developed for 
data-driven businesses similarly as for traditional business models because there exist 
(standalone) businesses that engage in specific activities of the data mining process.  
To arrive at such a solution, common techniques of a functional analysis should identify the 
significant people functions involved and the investments made and risks assumed within the 
data mining process. Based on the above conceptual analysis of the data mining process, the 
                                                 
30 See https://usa.visa.com/run-your-business/commercial-solutions/solutions/intellilink.html.  
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relative value contribution of the respective affiliated legal entities of an integrated firm in 
which such people functions and investments are located might then be identified by finding 
comparable functions and assets at standalone firms engaged in the same part of the data mining 
process. 
For instance, proxies for the value of collected raw data can be derived from prices that 
companies focusing on data collection demand for their services. Such companies exist across 
many industries.31 If an affiliate of a company running a digital platform is only concerned with 
collecting data in its specific market, and if this data is processed and analyzed in business 
functions at a different location, profits can be allocated to this affiliate based on available 
market prices. If, however, such an affiliate is also engaged in processing the data to contribute 
to the business’ success (e.g., when software engineers are engaged in the R&D process), the 
identified market prices for the raw data can only be the lower bound for allocating profits. As 
a firm is involved in more activities towards the (valuable) part of the data mining process 
(towards the right on Figures 2 and 3), finding comparable transactions becomes a more 
complicated task. In such a situation, the profit split method should be considered to find 
consistent transfer pricing solutions.32 The OECD’s recent work on when and how to apply the 
profit split method and on revising the internationally accepted transfer pricing guidelines 
(OECD 2017c, 2018a) could build on these considerations to provide guidance as a 
comprehensive, consensus-based solution in a timely manner. 
5. Conclusions 
Taxing digital businesses ranks high on the international policy agenda. The discussion on 
specific tax rules for the digital economy is gaining momentum since the release of the OECD’s 
interim report on the tax challenges of digitalization and, more specifically, since the European 
Commission’s publication of two draft Council Directives in March 2018. The OECD 
concludes that (yet to be reformed) tax rules should not depart from the existing framework and 
that further work on concepts of aligning taxation with value creation is necessary to arrive at 
internationally coordinated solutions. The European Commission, in contrast, proposes the 
Significant Digital Presence as a new taxable nexus in the digital economy and the Digital 
Services Tax as an interim solution to impose a levy on gross revenue from certain digital 
transactions. 
                                                 
31 This market is also called Data as a Service (https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=IDC_P31301). See, 
e.g., McKinsey Global Institutes (2016), https://www.greenbook.org/market-research-firms/data-collection.  
32 Evidently, our proposed solution relies on international cooperation between tax authorities as much as other 
transfer pricing-based solution including transactional profit split methods do.  
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Unlike the seemingly uniform argumentation in the policy debate, the empirical evidence is 
much less clear on the tax challenges of the digital economy. Our literature review provides 
little support for the claim that firms in the digital economy engage in particularly aggressive 
profit shifting. Policymakers should be concerned about the collection of consumption taxes 
and the enforcement of the destination principle against the background of an immense VAT 
gap in the European Union. What is more, one should expect that companies with digital 
business models respond to international tax competition by (re-)locating their significant 
(intangible) assets and functions via real investment. Such behavior would be an ultimate 
example of economic distortion via taxes. Against this background, the OECD’s approach to 
further analyze digital business models and avoid ring-fencing, short-term measures appear 
much more sensible than the European Commission’s effort to impose additional burdens or 
even new forms of taxes on businesses engaging in digital transactions. Overall, it is surprising 
that policymakers are primarily concerned with combatting tax avoidance in the digital 
economy given that most economists’ view on the prospects of digitalization would rather call 
for designing tax rules that do not distort investment decisions. Along these lines, the European 
Commission’s approach of taxing digital businesses contradicts its general endeavors to 
establish favorable conditions for a flourishing digital single market in the European Union. 
Although the concept of taxing business profits according to value creation is imperfect itself, 
we use it to propose a conceptual way forward for a consensus-based, timely solution to tax 
businesses in the digital economy. We argue that the question of a taxable nexus is not a primary 
issue unless the pure collection of data via the internet is considered a particular value driver. 
In contrast, many firms with digital business models invest in (digital) assets and employ people 
in locations where they have a significant market. We analyze data mining as a concept that 
reflects the value creation process in many digital business models. In particular, we highlight 
that data mining consists of several processes that altogether make data valuable. Although the 
tax system is outdated, we provide some thoughts on how existing principles of transfer pricing 
can be applied to data-driven businesses since third party transactions along the value chain of 
data mining exist and can be priced.  
While arguments exist that the current tax system relies on flawed foundations that lack 
justification, fundamental reform options that might overcome these weaknesses and have the 
merit of not taxing mobile assets and activities do not seem feasible in the near future given the 
often-conflicting national interests. Instead, tax policy itself might leverage the abundant data 
the digital economy provides for. For example, arm’s length prices for data-driven intangibles 
might be available if several business models of data providers across the value chain of data 
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mining are used as a benchmark. In sum, we recognize a substantial need for further research 
in various disciplines on how value is created in digital business models in order to substantiate 
the debate of how profits generated by digital businesses should be taxed. 
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